

FEB 2 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Analysis of Manpower in CIA

1. As a result of a request of 14 October 1955 from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of the House of Representatives, a special task force was established under the Inspector General composed of two representatives each from the DD/I, DD/P, and DD/S to analyze the manpower situation in CIA. The Chief of the Management Staff assisted the Inspector General in this study and a member of the I.O.'s staff served as secretary of the group.

2. The letter from the Post Office and Civil Service Committee addressed itself primarily to the objective of a 10 per cent reduction in manpower. In your reply of 18 November 1955 you indicated your intention to make the requested survey, but advised that a reduction in manpower might not be practical or in the national interest in an organization as ~~big~~ as the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly with more requirements levied on the organization than can be satisfied with present manpower. Consequently, the task force not only examined how an arbitrary 10 per cent reduction in manpower could be accomplished, and attempted to uncover any duplication of effort which might exist within CIA or between CIA and any other Government agency, but also solicited information on what tasks were being performed for other agencies and what existing or potential requirements on the Agency could not be filled with present manpower. It is believed that this will provide you with a more accurate picture of the manpower conditions in CIA while filling the requirement of the House Committee.

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3. It is of interest to note that in answer to Question 2 concerning possible duplication, functions performed to support other agencies or for other agencies, it is indicated that [REDACTED] individuals in the DD/I area and at least [REDACTED] in the DD/P are so occupied.

FIRST QUESTION:

What function would you eliminate, or what procedure would you follow if a 10 per cent reduction from manpower on-duty 31 October 1955 was required?

ANSWER:

DD/I:

Substantial savings of personnel would probably result from consolidation of the present seven offices into an intelligence collection and information office comprising the functions of OO and OOR, and an intelligence production office integrating present functions of ORR, OSI and OBI on the one hand and OOI and ONE on the other. However, it is questionable whether the disruption of effort, losses of key personnel and the other confusions resulting from such a major reorganization would be worth the eventual savings in manpower. In any event such a reorganization would have to receive a most careful and mature study before implementation. The alternative to such organizational changes is a selective curtailment or elimination of functions based upon relative priorities. This would be applied within the DD/I area essentially as follows, with four offices bearing the brunt and three remaining untouched. Ceiling and on-duty strength as of 31 October 1955 shown in parenthesis.

O/DD/I: (c. 20; o.d. 17). This office would meet a 10 per cent reduction in the DD/I area by cutting out the newly created International Communism Staff [REDACTED] people).

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The effect upon work and services would be qualitative, rather than quantitative. As to current intelligence production, timeliness and accuracy would be impaired, increasing the vulnerability to error. It would be impractical to reduce the work on any given area more proportionately than any other area, since critical situations throughout the world cannot be predicted, and since area analysts cannot readily be interchanged to meet unexpected developments.

25X9A2 [REDACTED]

OPR: (c. 774; o.d. 755). A 12 per cent reduction [REDACTED] would require a significant curtailment in OPR's ability to fulfill its assigned primary responsibilities in providing intelligence on the economies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in response to demands from the Department of Defense and the IAC agencies [REDACTED] the effectiveness of economic intelligence support to the clandestine services and to the National Intelligence Surveys would be adversely affected [REDACTED] geographic intelligence support to the clandestine services and to military escape and evasion programs would be substantially reduced by elimination of work on Latin America and Africa and by a 30 per cent curtailment in the effort placed on the Middle East and Western Europe [REDACTED]; OPR's ability to provide the specially constructed maps required

25X9A2 [REDACTED]

25X9A2 [REDACTED]

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for HIE's and for CIA and NIS publications would decrease [REDACTED] 25X9A2
curtailment in the [REDACTED] would 25X1B4d
result in a slowing up of analyses that yield factual information
on Sino-Soviet industrial development [REDACTED] and the effectiveness 25X9A2
of the interagency effort to obtain and make available for both
operational and planning purposes current maps published abroad
would be reduced by at least 25 per cent [REDACTED] 25X9A2

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00: Contact Division, 00 (c. 321; o.d. 333). A reduction of
12 per cent or [REDACTED] positions would result in a decline in the
efficiency of the collection effort in the field as it would be
impossible to maintain close continuing contact with present
sources or to open up new sources. This reduction would also be at
the expense of the central index of sources. The minimum records
required to comply with NSCDD 7 would continue to be maintained,
but the reduction would result in (a) a substantial decrease in the
character and degree of service, (b) increased burden on the field,
(c) the curtailed use of, or inability to continue, the existing
machine file of approximately 1,500,000 punch cards, and (d) a
serious decrease in the source records available for use in the
Agency emergency relocation center. 25X9A2

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[REDACTED] 00 (c. 336; o.d. 337). A 12 per cent reduction of per-
sonnel or [REDACTED] positions would require the elimination of one small
specialized bureau such as [REDACTED] abandonment 25X1A6a
of the study and synthesis of propaganda, reduction of the dissemina-
tion by [REDACTED] virtual halving of economic
reporting; reduction of maintenance of electronic equipment; and

occasional inability to meet routine and special requirements, regardless of priority. It would also mean abandonment of training programs or continuing them with further sacrifice of mission.

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[REDACTED] 00 (c. 286; o.d. 297). A 12 per cent reduction of personnel or [REDACTED] positions would result in the elimination of

25X1A6a
[REDACTED]
cent decrease in the ability to screen foreign documents for intelligence information and a 14 per cent curtailment of the editorial operation.

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OCR: (c. 643; o.d. 670). Would be seriously crippled by an 11 per cent cut in manpower [REDACTED] and would have to operate its branch libraries on a half-day rather than a full-day basis. It would have to eliminate the Library's clipping service, and cease providing special bibliographic and reference services except to the immediate offices of the DCI, DDCI, and three Deputies. It would probably be necessary to cease compiling industrial data for all countries outside the Soviet Bloc, even though this would leave the Agency open to the charge of having been very short-sighted if, following Russian incursions into Western Europe, we were suddenly called upon to provide information on the industrial plants which had fallen into Russian hands. We should have to cease compiling advance information on international conferences where persons of the Soviet Bloc might be accessible for exploitation. Most serious, however,

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would be the cumulative effects of shortened manpower in all units, and the growth of backlogs of unindexed and uncontrolled materials. Inevitable consequences would be lessened efficiency, and less speedy, less complete, and less accurate answers to all questions.

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ONE:OSI:OBI:

No reduction in these offices. They are already small offices and further reduction would be inconsistent with DCID 4/6 (Priority National Intelligence Objectives) and other priorities established by the DCI and the IAC.

TOTAL

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DD/P:

A determination would be made as to the required size of the Headquarters organization as well as the size of the Agency's overseas stations and units, including personnel assigned to such units from other components of the Agency and in support of DD/P operations. The relationship in size between Headquarters and overseas would then be maintained throughout the reduction-in-force. An ad hoc group would develop a figure by which each Headquarters and overseas component must be reduced to accumulate a total of [REDACTED] for DD/P as a whole. Those functions which, in accordance with the findings of question two below, are judged to be duplicatory or permissible to terminate and which it is believed could be transferred or eliminated within a year would be first priority items for reduction in this exercise. Following this, the chief of each component would be ordered to select the exact ceiling positions to be eliminated. DD/P would press for a procedure which would permit the retention of the most qualified individuals rather

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than a procedure based on the established Civil Service reduction-in-force principles.

DD/S:

A determination would be made of the direct support required for continuing operations, plus that housekeeping support necessary to the Agency in general. This determination must be made on the basis of established operational plans. On this basis the percentage of reduction in the support field might be less than, or considerably greater than, the desired over-all Agency reduction of ten per cent. When the percentage applicable to DD/S has been determined, a reduction would not necessarily be effected in equal percentage among the DD/S components. The prime interests of the Agency in security protection, official personnel records, financial and property accounts, and other legal responsibilities must receive priority attention. Those support functions which would be significantly affected by a 10 per cent over-all reduction in support personnel are: extension of the annual physical examination program, records management, extensive service to Career Boards aiding in the selection of individuals for membership in the Career Staff, furniture repair, typewriter repair, mail and courier service, bus and motor pool service, real estate and construction services, review of proprietary accounts, policing of accounts receivable, review and analysis of the budget, custodial service at [REDACTED] (could be handled by contractual arrangement), covert instruction, language and area training, testing and assessment services, communication services, investigation of pending security cases and periodic re-investigation of personnel.

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SECOND QUESTION:

Are any organizational units now performing any functions or activity which is being performed, in whole or in part, by another component of this Agency or by another Government agency?

ANSWER:

DD/I:

There is little evidence of duplication in the assignment of functions as between the DD/I and other components of the Agency or other Government departments. Such duplications and overlaps as exist stem primarily from misapplication of the provisions of existing directives. Continuous progress is being made in the elimination of such duplication through working level liaison and the coordinating influence of the IAC subcommittees. The only significant exception appears to be in the area of Current Intelligence. CIA and each of the military departments are producing a series of Current Intelligence publications. If agreement were to be reached among the IAC agencies for the production of a single series of Current Intelligence publications coordinated by CIA, each of the intelligence agencies could effect substantial personnel savings. Such an agreement would require CIA to abandon its present responsibility for current intelligence except in those areas for which the Agency has an assigned research responsibility. The Agency would essentially have no more than a coordinating role similar to the MIS responsibility. In addition the DCI would have to rely upon other agencies for substantive support in preparation for NSC briefings. Within such a limited concept the

Office of Current Intelligence could perhaps effect an eventual saving of approximately 25X9A2 people. In addition, the DD/I area as a whole, and especially the O/DD/I, ONE and CCI, is frequently required to furnish high level consumers with special memoranda, statements and speeches, many of which duplicate the information available in current intelligence publications. This activity consumes the services of approximately 25X9A2 personnel per year.

TOTAL DUPLICATING FUNCTIONS
(3% of DD/I Ceiling 31 Oct.)

Most of the services of common concern performed by the DD/I are specified in the various ESCID's and DCID's. However, in addition to these, there are a number of other important functions which have been assumed by the DD/I on behalf of other components of the Agency or other departments. Since the intelligence significance of these functions are not always apparent, it appears desirable to spell out these functions in detail as they constitute 15 per cent of the total DD/I effort and consume 25X9A2 personnel per year:

1. OPR: In addition to the various production and coordination functions assigned to OPR by ESCID's and DCID's, the following support functions and services of common concern are performed:

a. Under an agreement of August 1947, revised in August 1948, between the Departments of State and the CIA, the cartographic map library, and geographic intelligence functions of the Department of State were transferred to the CIA as services of common concern to the intelligence community and have functioned effectively in this capacity through the subsequent years.

b. In response to letters from the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security in April 1952, requesting intelligence support by CIA to the economic defense program of the U. S. Government, ORR has provided, on a continuing basis, intelligence research support and advice through active participation both in Washington and at conferences abroad.


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[REDACTED]

c. In May 1954, the Economic Defense Advisory Committee requested the CIA to provide for the analysis and centralized review of intelligence information in support of the enforcement of trade controls. This function has been ably performed by ORR since that date.

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[REDACTED]

d. Following an interagency survey requested at a meeting of the IAC in January 1951, CIA initiated in ORR

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intelligence community.

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[REDACTED]

e. ORR chairs an informal Interagency Map Procurement Coordinating Committee established in 1947 with representation from the various mapping and map holding components of the U. S. Government. ORR has maintained an efficient staff in support of this Committee's work and has thereby maximized coordinated procurement of maps from foreign areas through appropriate collection channels.

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f. In response to a request from the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force of June 1953, ORR plays an important coordinating role in the production of geographic contributions to the U. S. military escape and evasion program.

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
g. The joint [REDACTED] approved by the IAC in January 1953 (IAC-D-59), authorized ORR to coordinate U. S. activities in support of the program. Effective staffing of this support has greatly increased observational reporting from behind the Iron Curtain.

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h. At the request of representatives from the Department of State and with interagency agreement, ORR provides guidance to economic reporting officers stationed within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This activity, conducted by ORR as a service of common concern, has resulted in much more effective reporting from the Sino-Soviet Bloc in response to the requirements of the intelligence community.

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

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3.  In addition to coordinating the procurement of foreign language publications (NSCID 16) FDD also provides translation services for CIA and when possible for the other IAC agencies, especially in the more rare languages.

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4. OCR: All the services provided by OCR, except for a small number of special jobs in direct support of operations are made freely available to other members of the intelligence community. All of these are services which must be performed by CIA itself and which, though costly to establish with the special equipment needed for speed and efficiency, can be extended to other members of the community at relatively little additional cost once they are in operation. The Federal Government would obviously be guilty of poor economy if it required each agency to do for itself those chores which can more cheaply be done by a single central agency charged, as in CIA, with the responsibility of achieving coordination in the intelligence community. Approximately 20 per cent

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 of the OCR effort directly supports activities on behalf of other government departments and agencies.

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

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5. OSI: NSC-169 (Electromagnetic Communication) directs CIA, among other things, to provide a mechanism for evaluating the technical effectiveness of U. S. overseas broadcasting. This responsibility, which provides intelligence support to USIA, FCC, and the Department of State on Soviet communications and jamming capabilities is being discharged by an Electromagnetic Warfare Branch (ESW) in the Electronics Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Elimination of this function would provide a saving of [REDACTED] personnel.

TOTAL SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS
(15% of DD/I Ceiling 31 Oct.)

DD/P1

1. DEFENSE - Material Stockpiling



Propose that CIA eliminate from its stockpile all items except those peculiar to it only and draw on the military for any cold war requirement.

2. DEFENSE - Research and Development


Indication of duplication between CIA and military on research and development activities.

Propose review to determine extent of duplication and steps necessary to assure that efforts complement each other.

Cannot
be
Estimated


3. DEFENSE - Communications

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be
Estimated

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
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6. ISIA or

Certain propaganda projects designed for general conditioning of public opinion have reached a stage where they can be turned over to overt group.

Propose that CIA phase out of direct support and exploitation of such projects as soon as espionage and CE considerations permit. Examples are:


a. Organization for civil rights and

25X6D



104-1

25X6D



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7. ICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES - NSC 1290 (d) Projects

These programs are primarily overt in character, and outside CIA's sphere of responsibility. Propose they be transferred to ICA or other government agencies with CIA responsible for only training small groups of highly specialized FBI-type forces.

E. g., Propose that training program for [REDACTED] security policy be turned over to ICA.

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8. STATE DEPARTMENT - Economic Reporting

Propose that economic reporting, particularly in Latin America, and intelligence operations relating to East-West trade transactions and controls, where information is obtained chiefly through liaison, be transferred to State Department. These economic policies and programs are preponderantly overt and thus render covert supplementary action virtually unnecessary.

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**TOTAL ESTIMATED PERSONNEL SAVINGS BY ELIMINATION OR TRANSFER
OF THESE FUNCTIONS**

25X9A2

or

PERCENTAGE OF DD/P CILLING.....

DD/s:

Intra-CIA

1. **Training:** DD/P-SR is conducting some training in connection with the [REDACTED] Some manpower saving might result if this training were incorporated with training in OTR.
2. **Personnel Recordkeeping:** The Management Staff is presently studying Agency personnel procedures. Without attempting to predict the findings of this study, it appears likely that recordkeeping functions are already duplicated unnecessarily. There is potential duplication in other areas of personnel management but positive evidence has not been established to identify specifications.
3. **Supply:** It is suggested that the present Agency supply system, particularly the recordkeeping and reporting, be surveyed to determine possible manpower savings.
4. **Communications:** There may be some identical functions such as research, development and maintenance of stock records.

INTER-AGENCY

5. **Furniture Repair:** Elimination of this function is possible if the work is transferred to the General Services Administration.
6. **Ordnance Repair and Rehabilitation:** The Department of Defense has subh facilities. If the functions were transferred it is believed urgent requirements would suffer.

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7. Printing Services: Some unclassified printing is now being prepared by the Government Printing Office. The GPO has facilities for doing other Agency work but because of sensitivity and classification of most of the Agency's printing requirements it has not been considered feasible to request their assistance.

8. Training: OTR has made a serious effort during the past several years to take advantage of all Government and university area and language courses. Experience has shown that, in the majority of cases, the most efficient, economical and secure method of providing language and area instruction for Agency employees is through internal CIA programs.

TOTAL DD/S

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THIRD QUESTION:

Are there functions or requirements now assigned you which are beyond your present capacity to perform? If so, give an indication of the number of additional personnel required to perform such functions.

ANSWER:

DD/I:

There are many areas within the DD/I in which present coverage of assigned functions is dangerously inadequate; there are other areas in which substantial improvement in the coverage of existing functions could be obtained through increases in personnel.

1. ONE: Increase personnel by six for maximum efficiency in operation of office as a whole (one for each of four regional groups: NE, FE, SE, and WE; one for permanent assignment to work of NSC Net

Evaluation Subcommittee; and one general utility on community work, the IAC Secretariat in particular). 25X9A2

2. OSI: Increase personnel by [] in order to:

a. Accelerate development of new applications of science and technology to the intelligence process; i.e., obtaining "hard facts" as recommended by the Technological Capabilities Panel ([] personnel);

b. Broaden surveillance of foreign guided missiles and nuclear energy activities ([] personnel);

c. Strengthen Office support of scientific and technical intelligence coordinating activities ([] personnel); and


d. Broaden the scope of coverage on foreign basic sciences to include key areas such as oceanography, upper atmosphere, astronautics, automation, seismology, geology and astronomy ([] personnel).

3. OSI: The level of HIS activity is increasing substantially as a result of progressive expansion of the HIS to provide basic intelligence required for Psychological Warfare and United States Information Agency programs; increase in Chapter I production, greater emphasis on maintenance revisions of published HIS; further development of the new HIS "Key Personalities" unit, and participation in the new International Communism program. The full impact of these developments on OSI activity is expected in FY 1957. The present workload requires five additional personnel, already approved by the DD/I. To cope with the increased workload in FY 1957 will require [] additional personnel, a total of [] which would increase the T/O to [] positions.

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4. OSR: An increase in personnel by [REDACTED] would be necessary to:

- a. Meet fully community expectations for aggregative military economic analysis of Soviet capabilities;
- b. Satisfy the rapidly growing demand for studies on Soviet economic penetration of non-Bloc countries;
- c. Correct deficiencies in aggregative economic research on the European Satellites;
- d. Serve the community through maximum exploitation of special source materials for economic intelligence;
- e. Fulfill effectively OSR's responsibilities in correcting major economic research deficiencies identified by the EIC;



- g. Strengthen intelligence support to the enforcement of trade controls; and
- h. Provide a modest increase in the capabilities of several supporting services, such as cartography, photo intelligence, and geographic research, to meet more effectively the priority demands placed upon them.

5. OO: Office of the AD/O: This Office is in urgent need of staff assistance to cope with interagency, interoffice and inter-division liaison and problems. This would entail the addition of a minimum of [REDACTED] people.

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6. 00: Contact Division: All major responsibilities currently assigned to the Division are being carried out to some degree; however, the domestic collection program, when viewed from the standpoint of existing requirements, priorities and proven potential, is inadequate to meet the needs of the intelligence community with maximum efficiency. It is believed that a personnel increase of [REDACTED] would largely accomplish this. These positions would be allocated to:

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a. Improved collection of scientific and technical intelligence by the addition of technically trained collectors to the field, with appropriate clerical support [REDACTED] positions);

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b. More extensive exploitation of aliens in the U.S. by the addition to the field of collectors having Slavic language competence [REDACTED] positions); and

c. More effective support of the other IAC agencies, under NSCID 7, by the provision of adequate clerical support to IAC member representatives already, or to be, assigned to domestic field offices [REDACTED] positions).

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[REDACTED]

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7. 00: [REDACTED] Propaganda analysis should be expanded both in depth and in breadth with an augmentation of [REDACTED] analysts and research assistants. Agencies presently equipped and authorized to perform direction finding missions are unable and unwilling to divert their efforts to the broadcasts bands. [REDACTED] believes that with [REDACTED] additional positions and the equipment it could provide this information on many [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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8. [REDACTED] In order merely to meet the existing priority requirements of the IAC agencies for intelligence information from foreign documents, an additional [REDACTED] positions are necessary.

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9. OCR: Increase personnel strength by [REDACTED] in order to improve efficiency, speed, and accuracy of services now being performed:

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a. [REDACTED] in CIA Library to cut processing time on incoming documents and give service on requests which now exceed capacity;


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b. [REDACTED] to Biographic Register in order to bring under control a larger proportion of the incoming data and make files more current;

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c. [REDACTED] to Special Register to enable it to index all incoming special intelligence instead of only a fraction, and to do a really first-rate job of the NSC 169 mission;

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e. [REDACTED] to Machine Division to keep pace with demands for machine service which now exceed capacity, and to smooth over the transition to Minicard in the coming year.

All of the above are services being performed in response to needs of both DD/I and DD/P, and all are made available upon request to other agencies of the IAC. All are now being performed on a level of barely acceptable performance.

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TOTAL INCREASE
PERCENTAGE

DD/P:OVERSEAS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS BEYOND OUR PRESENT CAPACITY AND
ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL NEEDED:

In the initial development of their programs of operations for FY 1957, the Clandestine Services Area Divisions (including IO) estimated a requirement of additional overseas personnel which was 25X9A2 above the number provided for by the FY 1957 ceiling as subsequently established by the Director. The operational requirements represented by this figure include only those carefully screened and selected locations and objectives which are the most critical need for expanded or additional Clandestine Services activity. Many further possibilities for profitable and useful action were excluded.

1. It is now estimated that 25X9A2 of the 25X9A2 personnel programmed above the FY 1957 ceiling could be provided for by offsetting reductions that normally occur and elimination of overseas requirements that are no longer valid, leaving a net increase of 25X9A2 which could not be met under the ceiling.

2. The 25X9A2 additional personnel positions are needed to carry out the following programmed operational requirements which are beyond our present capacity to perform:

a. The need for aggressive counter-communist effort in
25X1A6a [REDACTED] including such activities as penetration of Soviet and
Satellite installations;

b. The general insufficiency of our clandestine intel-
ligence collection effort toward the European Satellites
and the USSR itself;

c. The insufficiency of our psychological and political
activities generally throughout the Middle East area, and
the need for development of a wartime resistance organization
25X1A6a in [REDACTED]

d. The need for more extensive and effective political-
psychological effort in Southeast Asia, especially 25X1A6a [REDACTED]
25X1A6a [REDACTED]

e. The urgent need for much more extensive clandestine
intelligence collection effort against 25X1A6a [REDACTED] and

f. The need for political, psychological, and counter-
intelligence action against the efforts of international
communism in Latin America.

3. While the above programming included some provision for
expansion in Latin American activities, it has since become
apparent that the Clandestine Services program in Latin America
should be even more intensive than contemplated at that time.
This will represent a requirement of approximately [REDACTED] additional
personnel above the FY 1957 program.

4. Likewise, the programming for FY 1957 does not provide
for the development of a much needed reserve capability in terms
of trained intelligence officers.

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INCREASED HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS:

5. The same programming for FY 1957 estimated needs for personnel increases for Clandestine Services Headquarters at approximately ^{25X9A2} above the FY 1955 number on board. The ceiling as established by the Director provided ^{25X9A2} positions, above the 1955 level, for certain specifically named, high priority, Headquarters activities, and an additional ^{25X9A2} to be distributed as needed. As compared with the initially estimated ^{25X9A2} this leaves approximately ^{25X9A2} of this requirement still unprovided for under the ceiling. Except for the ^{25X9A2} the Clandestine Services Headquarters can get along without this ^{25X9A2} without insurmountable difficulty if the Field needs estimated above are not met. If such Field needs should be filled, Clandestine Services Headquarters would need either: (a) a proportionate increase to support such Field expansion ^{25X9A2} or (b) a streamlining of the Headquarters organization to find means of supporting Field expansion with a Headquarters increase of ^{25X9A2} ^{25X9A2}

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25X9A2

25X1A8a

6. The ^{25X9A2} has grown steadily to its present ceiling of ^{25X9A2} and with the performance of approximately \$1,000 of overtime each working day, this growth has by no means ended. Unless more personnel can be added, overtime cannot be reduced and may even increase. The largest backlog exists in the maintenance of index cards and personality files. ^{25X9A2} together reference indices for CIA as well as other elements of the U. S. Government. Over ^{25X9A2} are carried in the index. However, the current backlog amounts to over ^{25X9A2}

25X1A8a

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Business machines are being introduced into [REDACTED] which may offer some manpower relief but will not erase the need for additional personnel. The Government's internal security needs may throw an additional immense task on [REDACTED] of performing visa checks. Should visa checks become a function, the present strength of [REDACTED] would have to be doubled. Therefore, it can be firmly anticipated that [REDACTED] will undergo further expansion due to a steadily increasing volume of material already handled at Headquarters and to demands for new services. An average annual growth of 10 per cent (increase of [REDACTED] for FY 1957) is believed to be likely for several years without the assumption of responsibility for visa checks.

25X1A8a

25X1A8a

25X1A8a

25X9A2

25X9A2

TOTAL INCREASE

PERCENTAGE

or [REDACTED]

DD/S:

Functions or requirements now assigned which are beyond our present capacity to perform at the scope and/or pace considered necessary are:

1. Effective and systematic audit of confidential funds;
2. Increase in medical service;
3. Continuance of the clerical training program;
4. Instruction in reading improvement;
5. Speed up processing of benefit claims;
6. Development of position and qualification standards;
7. Procurement of personnel to meet current attrition;
8. Proper maintenance of wire, microwave and ciphering systems;

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9. Establishment of "quick reaction capability" for the production of equipment for clandestine services;
10. Inventories of cryptographic stocks;
11. Protective traffic analysis;
12. Performing budget responsibilities to proprietary and other special projects;
13. Inventory of ordnance equipment;
14. Reduction in backlog of cases pending security investigation; and
15. Reinvestigation of employes.

/s/ Lyman Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
Chairman, Special Committee
on Manpower Study

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